Sunday, June 5, 2016

Art Of War [ 孫子兵法 ] Update June 05, 2016

UPDATE IS ON THE WAY

Art Of War [ 孫子兵法 ] 

By Sun Zi [ SunTzu ]

Complete Chinese text with its English translation.

Revised January 1996, June 2016.


The English translation by by Lionel Giles. At end of every chapter.

 The Art of War has 13 Chapters. 
     Contents
 1  Initial Estimations               計篇第一
 2  Waging War                        作戰篇第二
 3  Planning Offensives             謀攻篇第三
 4  Military Disposition             形篇第四
 5  Strategic Military Power     勢篇第五
 6  Vacuity and Substance        虛實篇第六
 7  Military Combat                  軍爭篇第七
 8  Nine Changes                       九變篇第八
 9  Maneuvering the Army       行軍篇第九
10  Configurations of Terrain  地形篇第十
11  Nine Terrains                      九地篇第十一
12  Incendiary Attacks             火攻篇第十二
13  Employing Spies                 用間篇第十三
    Notes                                      序言
 

本版以李曉渝之國標碼電子版為本,改為繁體大五碼,編緝修訂。
凡國標碼表中無對應的漢字,均已補入。
                                                                                                                                                          一九九六年春 裴明龍 謹記     

01《孫子兵法》計篇第一 計篇              
 
孫子曰:兵者,國之大事,死生之地,存亡之道,不可不察也。
 
故經之以五,校之以計,而索其情:一曰道,二曰天,三曰地,四曰
將,五曰法。道者,令民于上同意者也,可與之死,可與之生,民不
詭也。天者,陰陽、寒暑、時制也。地者,高下、遠近、險易、廣狹
、死生也。將者,智、信、仁、勇、嚴也。法者,曲制、官道、主用
也。凡此五者,將莫不聞,知之者勝,不知之者不勝。故校之以計,
而索其情。曰:主孰有道?將孰有能?天地孰得?法令孰行?兵眾孰
強?士卒孰練?賞罰孰明?吾以此知勝負矣。
 
將聽吾計,用之必勝,留之﹔將不聽吾計,用之必敗,去之。
 
計利以聽,乃為之勢,以佐其外。勢者,因利而制權也。
 
兵者,詭道也。故能而示之不能,用而示之不用,近而示之遠,遠而
示之近。利而誘之,亂而取之,實而備之,強而避之,怒而撓之,卑
而驕之,佚而勞之,親而離之,攻其不備,出其不意。此兵家之勝,
不可先傳也。
 
夫未戰而廟算勝者,得算多也﹔未戰而廟算不勝者,得算少也。多算
勝,少算不勝,而況無算乎!吾以此觀之,勝負見矣。
 
I. LAYING PLANS
 1. Sun Tzu said:  The art of war is of vital importance to the State.
 2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin.
     Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.
 3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into account in     one's deliberations,when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field.
 4. These are:  (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The Commander; (5) Met     hod and discipline.
5,6. The Moral Law causes the people to be in complete accord with their ruler, so that     they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger
7. Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons.
8. Earth comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open ground and n     arrow passes;  the chances of life and death. 
9. The Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom,  sincerely, benevolence, courage     and strictness.
10. By method and discipline are to be understood the marshaling of the army in its pro   per subdivisions, the graduations of rank among the officers, the maintenance  of 
   roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control of military expenditure.
11. These five heads should be familiar to every general:  he who knows them will be 
   victorious; he who knows them not will fail.
12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the military conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in this wise:--
13. (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued  with the Moral law?
      (2) Which of the two generals has most ability?
      (3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth?
      (4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?
      (5) Which army is stronger?
      (6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained?
      (7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and punishment?
14. By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or defeat.
15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will conquer: let such a 
     one be retained in command!   The general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts      upon it, will suffer defeat:--let such a one be dismissed!
16. While heading the profit of my counsel,
    avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances
    over and beyond the ordinary rules.
17. According as circumstances are favorable,
    one should modify one's plans.
18. All warfare is based on deception.
19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable;
    when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we
    are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away;
    when far away, we must make him believe we are near.
20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy.  Feign disorder,
    and crush him.
21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. 
    If he is in superior strength, evade him.
22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him.  
    Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant.
23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. 
    If his forces are united, separate them.
24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where
    you are not expected.
25. These military devices, leading to victory,
    must not be divulged beforehand.
26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many
    calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. 
    The general who loses a battle makes but few
    calculations beforehand.  Thus do many calculations
    lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: 
    how much more no calculation at all!  It is by attention
    to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.

 
02《孫子兵法》作戰篇第二 作戰篇           
 
孫子曰:凡用兵之法,馳車千駟,革車千乘,帶甲十萬,千里饋糧,
則內外之費,賓客之用,膠漆之材,車甲之奉,日費千金,然後十萬
之師舉矣。其用戰也貴勝,久則鈍兵挫銳,攻城則力屈,久暴師則國
用不足。夫鈍兵挫銳,屈力殫貨,則諸侯乘其弊而起,雖有智者,不
能善其後矣。故兵聞拙速,未睹巧之久也。夫兵久而國利者,未之有
也。故不盡知用兵之害者,則不能盡知用兵之利也。
 
善用兵者,役不再籍,糧不三載﹔取用于國,因糧于敵,故軍食可足
也。
 
國之貧于師者遠輸,遠輸則百姓貧。近師者貴賣,貴賣則百姓竭,財
竭則急於丘役。力屈、財殫,中原內虛于家。百姓之費,十去其七﹔
公家之費:破軍罷馬,甲冑矢弩,戟盾蔽櫓,丘牛大車,十去其六。
 
故智將務食于敵。食敵一鐘,當吾二十鐘﹔箕杆一石,當吾二十石。
 
故殺敵者,怒也﹔取敵之利者,貨也。故車戰,得車十乘已上,賞其
先得者,而更其旌旗,車雜而乘之,卒善而養之,是謂勝敵而益強。
 
故兵貴勝,不貴久。
 
故知兵之將,民之司命,國家安危之主也。
 
II. WAGING WAR
 1. Sun Tzu said:  In the operations of war, where there are in the field a thousand swift    chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand mail-clad soldiers, with pr    ovisions enough to carry them a thousand li, the expenditure at home and at the front,   including entertainment of guests, small items such as  glue and paint, and sums
    spent on chariots and armor, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per 
   day. Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men.
 2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory  is long in coming, then men's 
     weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be damped.  If you lay siege to a town,      you will exhaust your strength.
 3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be equal to 
     the strain.
 4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped,  your strength exhausted       and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your 
    extremity.  Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that      must ensue.
 5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen 
   associated with long delays.
 6. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.
 7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can 
     thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on.
 8. The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his supply-wagons 
    loaded more than twice.
 9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy.  Thus the army 
   will have food enough for its needs.
10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by contributions 
      from a distance.  Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes  the people       to be impoverished.
11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up; and high prices    cause the people's substance to be drained away.
12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry  will be afflicted by heavy    
     exactions.
13,14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion  of strength, the homes of the people      will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their income will be dissipated; while gove     rnment expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses,   breast-plates and helmets, b     ows and arrows, spears and shields,protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy
     wagons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue.
 15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy.  One cartload of the enemy's provisions  is equivalent to twenty of one's own, and likewise a single picul of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one's own store.
16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards.
17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken, those 
     should be rewarded who took the first. Our own flags should be substituted for 
     those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours. 
    The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.
18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one's own strength.
19. In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns.
20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies  is the arbiter of the people's fate, 
    the man on whom it  depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.
03《孫子兵法》謀攻篇第三 謀攻篇
 
孫子曰:凡用兵之法,全國為上,破國次之﹔全軍為上,破軍次之﹔
全旅為上,破旅次之﹔全卒為上,破卒次之﹔全伍為上,破伍次之。
是故百戰百勝,非善之善也﹔不戰而屈人之兵,善之善者也。
 
故上兵伐謀,其次伐交,其次伐兵,其下攻城。攻城之法為不得已。
修櫓轒轀]、具器械、三月而後成,距闉,又三月而後已。將不勝其忿
,而蟻附之,殺士三分之一,而城不拔者,此攻之災也。故善用兵者
,屈人之兵而非戰也。拔人之城而非攻也,破人之國而非久也,必以
全爭于天下,故兵不頓,而利可全,此謀攻之法也。
 
故用兵之法,十則圍之,五則攻之,倍則分之,敵則能戰之,少則能
逃之,不若則能避之。故小敵之堅,大敵之擒也。
 
夫將者,國之輔也。輔周則國必強,輔隙則國必弱。
 
故君之所以患于軍者三:不知軍之不可以進而謂之進,不知軍之不可
以退而謂之退,是為縻軍﹔不知三軍之事,而同三軍之政者,則軍士
惑矣﹔不知三軍之權,而同三軍之任,則軍士疑矣。三軍既惑且疑,
則諸侯之難至矣,是謂亂軍引勝。
 
故知勝有五:知可以戰與不可以戰者勝,識眾寡之用者勝,上下同欲
者勝,以虞待不虞者勝,將能而君不御者勝。此五者,知勝之道也。
 
故曰:知己知彼,百戰不貽﹔不知彼而知己,一勝一負﹔不知彼不知
己,每戰必貽。
 
III. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM
  1. Sun Tzu said:  In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's      country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good.  So, too, it is  
    better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachm    ent or a company entire than to destroy them.
 2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme 
     excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.
 3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's plans; the next best is to     prevent the junction of the enemy's forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy's      army in the field;  and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.
 4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it
    can possibly be avoided.  The preparation of mantlets,
    movable shelters, and various implements of war, will take
    up three whole months; and the piling up of mounds over
    against the walls will take three months more.
 
 5. The general, unable to control his irritation,
    will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants,
    with the result that one-third of his men are slain,
    while the town still remains untaken.  Such are the disastrous
    effects of a siege.
 
 6. Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's
    troops without any fighting; he captures their cities
    without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom
    without lengthy operations in the field.
 
 7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery
    of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph
    will be complete.  This is the method of attacking by stratagem.
 
 8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten
    to the enemy's one, to surround him; if five to one,
    to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army
    into two.
 
 9. If equally matched, we can offer battle;
    if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy;
    if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him.
 
10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made
    by a small force, in the end it must be captured
    by the larger force.
 
11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State;
    if the bulwark is complete at all points; the State will
    be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will
    be weak.
 
12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring
    misfortune upon his army:--
 
13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat,
    being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. 
    This is called hobbling the army.
 
14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the
    same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant
    of the conditions which obtain in an army.  This causes
    restlessness in the soldier's minds.
 
15. (3) By employing the officers of his army
    without discrimination, through ignorance of the
    military principle of adaptation to circumstances. 
    This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.
 
16. But when the army is restless and distrustful,
    trouble is sure to come from the other feudal princes. 
    This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging
    victory away.
 
17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials
    for victory:
    (1) He will win who knows when to fight and when
        not to fight.
    (2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior
        and inferior forces.
    (3) He will win whose army is animated by the same
        spirit throughout all its ranks.
    (4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take
        the enemy unprepared.
    (5) He will win who has military capacity and is
        not interfered with by the sovereign.
 
18. Hence the saying:  If you know the enemy
    and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a
    hundred battles.  If you know yourself but not the enemy,
    for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. 
    If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will
    succumb in every battle.
[To Chinese text |To Top]
 
 
 
IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS
 
 
 1. Sun Tzu said:  The good fighters of old first put
    themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then
    waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy.
 
 2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our
    own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy
    is provided by the enemy himself.
 3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat,
    but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.
 
 4. Hence the saying:  One may know how to conquer
    without being able to do it.
 
 5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics;
    ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.
 
 6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient
    strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength.
 
 7. The general who is skilled in defense hides in the
    most secret recesses of the earth; he who is skilled in
    attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven. 
    Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves;
    on the other, a victory that is complete.
 
 8. To see victory only when it is within the ken
    of the common herd is not the acme of excellence.
 
 9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight
    and conquer and the whole Empire says, "Well done!"
 
10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength;
    to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight;
    to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear.
 
11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is
    one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease.
 
12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation
    for wisdom nor credit for courage.
 
13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes. 
    Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty
    of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is
    already defeated.
 
14. Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into
    a position which makes defeat impossible, and does
    not miss the moment for defeating the enemy.
 
15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist
    only seeks battle after the victory has been won,
    whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights
    and afterwards looks for victory.
 
16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law,
    and strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is
    in his power to control success.
 
17. In respect of military method, we have,
    firstly, Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity;
    thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances;
    fifthly, Victory.
 
18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth;
    Estimation of quantity to Measurement; Calculation to
    Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to Calculation;
    and Victory to Balancing of chances.
 
19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as
    a pound's weight placed in the scale against a single grain.
 
20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting
    of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep.
 
[To Chinese text |To Top]
 
 
 
 
V. ENERGY
 
 
 1. Sun Tzu said:  The control of a large force
    is the same principle as the control of a few men: 
    it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers.
 
 2. Fighting with a large army under your command
    is nowise different from fighting with a small one: 
    it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals.
 
 3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand
    the brunt of the enemy's attack and remain unshaken--
    this is effected by maneuvers direct and indirect.
 
 4. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone
    dashed against an egg--this is effected by the science
    of weak points and strong.
 
 5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used
    for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed
    in order to secure victory.
 
 6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible
    as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams;
    like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew;
    like the four seasons, they pass away to return once more.
 
 7. There are not more than five musical notes,
    yet the combinations of these five give rise to more
    melodies than can ever be heard.
 
 8. There are not more than five primary colors
    (blue, yellow, red, white, and black), yet in combination
    they produce more hues than can ever been seen.
 
 9. There are not more than five cardinal tastes
    (sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet combinations
    of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted.
 
10. In battle, there are not more than two methods
    of attack--the direct and the indirect; yet these two
    in combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers.
 
11. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. 
    It is like moving in a circle--you never come to an end. 
    Who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination?
 
12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent
    which will even roll stones along in its course.
 
13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed
    swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy
    its victim.
 
14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible
    in his onset, and prompt in his decision.
 
15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow;
    decision, to the releasing of a trigger.
 
16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may
    be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all;
    amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without head
    or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat.
 
17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline,
    simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness
    postulates strength.
 
18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is
    simply a question of subdivision; concealing courage under
    a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy;
    masking strength with weakness is to be effected
    by tactical dispositions.
 
19. Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy
    on the move maintains deceitful appearances, according to
    which the enemy will act.  He sacrifices something,
    that the enemy may snatch at it.
 
20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march;
    then with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him.
 
21. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined
    energy, and does not require too much from individuals. 
    Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize
    combined energy.
 
22. When he utilizes combined energy, his fighting
    men become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones. 
    For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain
    motionless on level ground, and to move when on a slope;
    if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if
    round-shaped, to go rolling down.
 
23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men
    is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain
    thousands of feet in height.  So much on the subject
    of energy.
[To Chinese text |To Top]
 
 
 
VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG
 
 
 1. Sun Tzu said:  Whoever is first in the field and
    awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight;
    whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle
    will arrive exhausted.
 
 2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on
    the enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him.
 
 3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy
    to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage,
    he can make it impossible for the enemy to draw near.
 
 4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him;
    if well supplied with food, he can starve him out;
    if quietly encamped, he can force him to move.
 
 5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend;
    march swiftly to places where you are not expected.
 
 6. An army may march great distances without distress,
    if it marches through country where the enemy is not.
 
 7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks
    if you only attack places which are undefended.You can
    ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold
    positions that cannot be attacked.
 
 8. Hence that general is skillful in attack whose
    opponent does not know what to defend; and he is skillful
    in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack.
 
 9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy!  Through you
    we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible;
    and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands.
 
10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible,
    if you make for the enemy's weak points; you may retire
    and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid
    than those of the enemy.
 
11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced
    to an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high
    rampart and a deep ditch.  All we need do is attack
    some other place that he will be obliged to relieve.
 
12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent
    the enemy from engaging us even though the lines
    of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground. 
    All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable
    in his way.
 
13. By discovering the enemy's dispositions and remaining
    invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated,
    while the enemy's must be divided.
 
14. We can form a single united body, while the
    enemy must split up into fractions.  Hence there will
    be a whole pitted against separate parts of a whole,
    which means that we shall be many to the enemy's few.
 
15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force
    with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits.
 
16. The spot where we intend to fight must not be
    made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare
    against a possible attack at several different points;
    and his forces being thus distributed in many directions,
    the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will
    be proportionately few.
 
17. For should the enemy strengthen his van,
    he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear,
    he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left,
    he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right,
    he will weaken his left.  If he sends reinforcements everywhere,
    he will everywhere be weak.
 
18. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare
    against possible attacks; numerical strength, from compelling
    our adversary to make these preparations against us.
 
19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle,
    we may concentrate from the greatest distances in order
    to fight.
 
20. But if neither time nor place be known,
    then the left wing will be impotent to succor the right,
    the right equally impotent to succor the left, the van
    unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van. 
    How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are
    anything under a hundred LI apart, and even the nearest
    are separated by several LI!
 
21. Though according to my estimate the soldiers
    of Yueh exceed our own in number, that shall advantage
    them nothing in the matter of victory.  I say then
    that victory can be achieved.
 
22. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may
    prevent him from fighting.  Scheme so as to discover
    his plans and the likelihood of their success.
 
23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his
    activity or inactivity.  Force him to reveal himself,
    so as to find out his vulnerable spots.
 
24. Carefully compare the opposing army with your own,
    so that you may know where strength is superabundant
    and where it is deficient.
 
25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch
    you can attain is to conceal them; conceal your dispositions,
    and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest spies,
    from the machinations of the wisest brains.
 
26. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy's
    own tactics--that is what the multitude cannot comprehend.
 
27. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer,
    but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory
    is evolved.
 
28. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained
    you one victory, but let your methods be regulated
    by the infinite variety of circumstances.
 
29. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its
    natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards.
 
30. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong
    and to strike at what is weak.
 
31. Water shapes its course according to the nature
    of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works
    out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing.
 
32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape,
    so in warfare there are no constant conditions.
 
33. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his
    opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called
    a heaven-born captain.
 
34. The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth)
    are not always equally predominant; the four seasons make
    way for each other in turn.  There are short days and long;
    the moon has its periods of waning and waxing.
[To Chinese text  |To Top]

 
 
 
VII. MANEUVERING
 
 
 1. Sun Tzu said:  In war, the general receives his
    commands from the sovereign.
 
 2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces,
    he must blend and harmonize the different elements thereof
    before pitching his camp.
 
 3. After that, comes tactical maneuvering,
    than which there is nothing more difficult. 
    The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists
    in turning the devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain.
 
 4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route,
    after enticing the enemy out of the way, and though starting
    after him, to contrive to reach the goal before him,
    shows knowledge of the artifice of DEVIATION.
 
 5. Maneuvering with an army is advantageous;
    with an undisciplined multitude, most dangerous.
 
 6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order
    to snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be
    too late.  On the other hand, to detach a flying column
    for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage
    and stores.
 
 7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their
    buff-coats, and make forced marches without halting day
    or night, covering double the usual distance at a stretch,
    doing a hundred LI in order to wrest an advantage,
    the leaders of all your three divisions will fall into
    the hands of the enemy.
 
 8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded
    ones will fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth
    of your army will reach its destination.
 
 9. If you march fifty LI in order to outmaneuver
    the enemy, you will lose the leader of your first division,
    and only half your force will reach the goal.
 
10. If you march thirty LI with the same object,
    two-thirds of your army will arrive.
 
11. We may take it then that an army without its
    baggage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost;
    without bases of supply it is lost.
 
12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are
    acquainted with the designs of our neighbors.
 
13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march
    unless we are familiar with the face of the country--its
    mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices,
    its marshes and swamps.
 
14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantage
    to account unless we make use of local guides.
 
15. In war, practice dissimulation, and you will succeed.
 
16. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops,
    must be decided by circumstances.
 
17. Let your rapidity be that of the wind,
    your compactness that of the forest.
 
18. In raiding and plundering be like fire,
    is immovability like a mountain.
 
19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night,
    and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.
 
20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be
    divided amongst your men; when you capture new territory,
    cut it up into allotments for the benefit of the soldiery.
 
21. Ponder and deliberate before you make a move.
 
22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice
    of deviation.  Such is the art of maneuvering.
 
23. The Book of Army Management says:  On the field
    of battle, the spoken word does not carry far enough: 
    hence the institution of gongs and drums.  Nor can ordinary
    objects be seen clearly enough:  hence the institution
    of banners and flags.
 
24. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means
    whereby the ears and eyes of the host may be focused
    on one particular point.
 
25. The host thus forming a single united body,
    is it impossible either for the brave to advance alone,
    or for the cowardly to retreat alone.  This is the art
    of handling large masses of men.
 
26. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires
    and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and banners,
    as a means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army.
 
27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit;
    a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind.
 
28. Now a soldier's spirit is keenest in the morning;
    by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening,
    his mind is bent only on returning to camp.
 
29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when
    its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish
    and inclined to return.  This is the art of studying moods.
 
30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance
    of disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy:--this is the art
    of retaining self-possession.
 
31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still
    far from it, to wait at ease while the enemy is
    toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy
    is famished:--this is the art of husbanding one's strength.
 
32. To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose
    banners are in perfect order, to refrain from attacking
    an army drawn up in calm and confident array:--this
    is the art of studying circumstances.
 
33. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill
    against the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill.
 
34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight;
    do not attack soldiers whose temper is keen.
 
35. Do not swallow bait offered by the enemy. 
    Do not interfere with an army that is returning home.
 
36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. 
    Do not press a desperate foe too hard.
 
37. Such is the art of warfare.
[To Chinese text|To Top]
 

 
 
 
 



 
 
 
 
04《孫子兵法》形篇第四                  形篇
 
 
孫子曰:昔之善戰者,先為不可勝,以侍敵之可勝。不可勝在己,可
勝在敵。故善戰者,能為不可勝,不能使敵之必可勝。故曰:勝可知
,而不可為。不可勝者,守也﹔可勝者,攻也。守則不足,攻則有餘
。善守者,藏于九地之下﹔善攻者,動于九天之上。故能自保而全勝
也。
 
見勝不過眾人之所知,非善之善者也﹔戰勝而天下曰善,非善之善者
也。故舉秋毫不為多力,見日月不為明目,聞雷霆不為聰耳。古之所
謂善戰者,勝于易勝者也。故善戰之勝也,無智名,無勇功。故其戰
勝不忒。不忒者,其所措必勝,勝已敗者也。故善戰者,立于不敗之
地,而不失敵之敗也。是故勝兵先勝而後求戰,敗兵先戰而後求勝。
善用兵者,修道而保法,故能為勝敗之政。
 
兵法:一曰度,二曰量,三曰數,四曰稱,五曰勝。地生度,度生量
,量生數,數生稱,稱生勝。
 
故勝兵若以鎰稱銖,敗兵若以銖稱鎰。
 
勝者之戰民也,若決積水于千仞之谿者,形也。
 
[To English text]|[Go To Top]



 
 
 
 
05《孫子兵法》勢篇第五                  勢篇
 
 
孫子曰:凡治眾如治寡,分數是也﹔鬥眾如鬥寡,形名是也﹔三軍之
眾,可使必受敵而無敗,奇正是也﹔兵之所加,如以碫投卵者,虛實
是也。
 
凡戰者,以正合,以奇勝。故善出奇者,無窮如天地,不竭如江河。
終而復始,日月是也。死而復生,四時是也。聲不過五,五聲之變,
不可勝聽也。色不過五,五色之變,不可勝觀也。味不過五,五味之
變,不可勝嘗也。戰勢不過奇正,奇正之變,不可勝窮之也。奇正相
生,如環之無端,孰能窮之?
 
激水之疾,至于漂石者,勢也﹔鷙鳥之疾,至于毀折者,節也。是故
善戰者,其勢險,其節短。勢如張弩,節如發機。
 
紛紛紜紜,鬥亂而不可亂也。渾渾沌沌,形圓而不可敗也。
 
亂生于治,怯生于勇,弱生于強。治亂,數也﹔勇怯,勢也﹔強弱,
形也。
 
故善動敵者,形之,敵必從之﹔予之,敵必取之。以利動之,以卒動
之。
 
故善戰者,求之于勢,不責于人,故能擇人而任勢。任勢者,其戰人
也,如轉木石。木石之性,安則靜,危則動,方則止,圓則行。故善
戰人之勢,如轉圓石于千仞之山者,勢也。
 
[To English text]|[Go To Top]



 
 
 
 
06《孫子兵法》虛實篇第六                虛實篇
 
 
孫子曰:凡先處戰地而待敵者佚,後處戰地而趨戰者勞。故善戰者,
致人而不致于人。
 
能使敵自至者,利之也﹔能使敵不得至者,害之也。故敵佚能勞之,
飽能飢之,安能動之。
 
出其所不趨,趨其所不意。行千里而不勞者,行于無人之地也。攻而
必取者,攻其所不守也。守而必固者,守其所不攻也。
 
故善攻者,敵不知其所守。善守者,敵不知其所攻。
 
微乎微乎,至于無形,神乎神乎,至于無聲,故能為敵之司命。
 
進而不可御者,沖其虛也﹔退而不可追者,速而不可及也。故我欲戰
,敵雖高壘深溝,不得不與我戰者,攻其所必救也﹔我不欲戰,雖畫
地而守之,敵不得與我戰者,乖其所之也。
 
故形人而我無形,則我專而敵分﹔我專為一,敵分為十,是以十攻其
一也,則我眾而敵寡﹔能以眾擊寡者,則吾之所與戰者,約矣。吾所
與戰之地不可知,不可知,則敵所備者多,敵所備者多,則吾之所戰
者,寡矣。
 
故備前則後寡,備後則前寡,故備左則右寡,備右則左寡,無所不備
,則無所不寡。寡者備人者也,眾者使人備己者也。
 
故知戰之地,知戰之日,則可千里而會戰。不知戰之地,不知戰之日
,則左不能救右,右不能救左,前不能救後,後不能救前,而況遠者
數十里,近者數里乎?
 
以吾度之,越人之兵雖多,亦奚益于勝敗哉?!
 
故曰:勝可為也。敵雖眾,可使無鬥。
 
故策之而知得失之計,作之而知動靜之理,形之而知死生之地,角之
而知有餘不足之處。
 
故形兵之極,至于無形﹔無形,則深間不能窺,智者不能謀。
 
因形而錯勝于眾,眾不能知﹔人皆知我所以勝之形,而莫知吾所以制
勝之形。故其戰勝不復,而應形于無窮。
 
夫兵形象水,水之形避高而趨下,兵之形,避實而擊虛,水因地而制
流,兵應敵而制勝。故兵無常勢,水無常形,能因敵變化而取勝者,
謂之神。
 
故五行無常勝,四時無常位,日有短長,月有死生。
 



 
 
 
 
07《孫子兵法》軍爭篇第七                軍爭篇
 
孫子曰:凡用兵之法,將受命于君,合軍聚眾,交和而舍,莫難于軍
爭。軍爭之難者,以迂為直,以患為利。故迂其途,而誘之以利,後
人發,先人至,此知迂直之計者也。
 
故軍爭為利,軍爭為危。舉軍而爭利,則不及﹔委軍而爭利,則輜重
捐。是故卷甲而趨,日夜不處,倍道兼行,百里而爭利,則擒三將軍
,勁者先,疲者後,其法十一而至﹔五十里而爭利,則蹶上將軍,其
法半至﹔三十里而爭利,則三分之二至。是故軍無輜重則亡,無糧食
則亡,無委積則亡。
 
故不知諸侯之謀者,不能豫交﹔不知山林、險阻、沮澤之形者,不能
行軍﹔不用鄉導者,不能得地利。
 
故兵以詐立,以利動,以分和為變者也。
 
故其疾如風,其徐如林,侵掠如火,不動如山,難知如陰,動如雷震
 
掠鄉分眾,廓地分守,懸權而動。
 
先知迂直之計者勝,此軍爭之法也。
 
                                                                                                                                               軍政曰:「言不相聞,故為金鼓;視而不見,故為旌旗。」夫
                                                                                                                                               金鼓旌旗者,所以一人之耳目也;人既專一, 則勇者不得獨進,
                                                                                                                                               怯者不得獨退,此用眾之法也。故夜戰多火鼓,
                                                                                                                                               晝戰多旌旗,所以變人之耳目也。
 
故三軍可奪氣,將軍可奪心。是故朝氣銳,晝氣惰,暮氣歸。故善用
兵者,避其銳氣,擊其惰歸,此治氣者也。以治待亂,以靜待嘩,此
治心者也。以近待遠,以佚待勞,以飽待飢,此治力者也。無邀正正
之旗,無擊堂堂之陣,此治變者也。
 
故用兵之法,高陵勿向,背丘勿逆,佯北勿從,銳卒勿攻,餌兵勿食
,歸師勿遏,圍師遺闕,窮寇勿迫,此用兵之法也。
 



 
 
 
 
08《孫子兵法》九變篇第八                九變篇
 
 
孫子曰:凡用兵之法,將受命于君,合軍聚眾,圮地無舍,衢地交和
,絕地勿留,圍地則謀,死地則戰。
 
途有所不由,軍有所不擊,城有所不攻,地有所不爭,君命有所不受
 
故將通于九變之利者,知用兵矣﹔將不通于九變之利,雖知地形,不
能得地之利矣﹔治兵不知九變之朮,雖知地利,不能得人之用矣。
 
是故智者之慮,必雜于利害。雜于利,而務可信也﹔雜于害,而患可
解也。
 
是故屈諸侯者以害,役諸侯者以業,趨諸侯者以利。
 
故用兵之法,無恃其不來,恃吾有以待也﹔無恃其不攻,恃吾有所不
可攻也。
 
故將有五危:必死,可殺也﹔必生,可虜也﹔忿速,可侮也﹔廉潔,
可辱也﹔愛民,可煩也。凡此五者,將之過也,用兵之災也。覆軍殺
將,必以五危,不可不察也。
 



 
 
 
 
09《孫子兵法》行軍篇第九                行軍篇
 
孫子曰:凡處軍、相敵,絕山依谷,視生處高,戰隆無登,此處山之
軍也。絕水必遠水﹔客絕水而來,勿迎之于水內,令半濟而擊之,利
﹔欲戰者,無附于水而迎客﹔視生處高,無迎水流,此處水上之軍也
。絕斥澤,惟亟去無留﹔若交軍于斥澤之中,必依水草,而背眾樹,
此處斥澤之軍也。平陸處易,而右背高,前死後生,此處平陸之軍也
。凡此四軍之利,黃帝之所以勝四帝也。
 
凡軍好高而惡下,貴陽而賤陰,養生而處實,軍無百疾,是謂必勝。
丘陵堤防,必處其陽,而右背之。此兵之利,地之助也。
 
上雨,水沫至,欲涉者,待其定也。
 
凡地有絕澗、天井、天牢、天羅、天陷、天隙,必亟去之,勿近也。
吾遠之,敵近之﹔吾迎之,敵背之。
 
軍旁有險阻、潢井、葭葦、林木、蘙薈者,必謹慎復索之,此伏奸之
所處也。
 
敵近而靜者,恃其險也﹔遠而挑戰者,欲人之進也﹔其所居易者,利
也。
 
眾樹動者,來也﹔眾草多障者,疑也﹔鳥起者,伏也﹔獸駭者,覆也
﹔塵高而銳者,車來也﹔卑而廣者,徒來也﹔散而條達者,樵采也﹔
少而往來者,營軍也。
 
辭卑而備者,進也﹔辭強而進驅者,退也﹔輕車先出其側者,陣也﹔
無約而請和者,謀也﹔奔走而陳兵者,期也﹔半進半退者,誘也。
 
杖而立者,飢也﹔汲而先飲者,渴也﹔見利而不進者,勞也﹔鳥集者
,虛也﹔夜呼者,恐也﹔軍擾者,將不重也﹔旌旗動者,亂也﹔吏怒
者,倦也﹔粟馬肉食,軍無懸缶而不返其舍者,窮寇也﹔諄諄翕翕,
徐與人言者,失眾也﹔數賞者,窘也﹔數罰者,困也﹔先暴而後畏其
眾者,不精之至也﹔來委謝者,欲休息也。兵怒而相迎,久而不合,
又不相去,必謹察之。
 
兵非貴益多也,惟無武進,足以并力、料敵、取人而已。夫惟無慮而
易敵者,必擒于人。
 
卒未親附而罰之,則不服,不服則難用也。卒已親附而罰不行,則不
可用也。故令之以文,齊之以武,是謂必取。令素行以教其民,則民
服﹔令素不行以教其民,則民不服。令素行者,與眾相得也。



 
 
 
 
10《孫子兵法》地形篇第十                地形篇
 
 
孫子曰:地形有通者、有挂者、有支者、有隘者、有險者、有遠者。
我可以往,彼可以來,曰通。通形者,先居高陽,利糧道,以戰則利
。可以往,難以返,曰挂。挂形者,敵無備,出而勝之,敵若有備,
出而不勝,則難以返,不利。我出而不利,彼出而不利,曰支。支形
者,敵雖利我,我無出也,引而去之,令敵半出而擊之,利。隘形者
,我先居之,必盈之以待敵。若敵先居之,盈而勿從,不盈而從之。
險形者,我先居之,必居高陽以待敵﹔若敵先居之,引而去之,勿從
也。遠形者,勢均,難以挑戰,戰而不利。凡此六者,地之道也,將
之至任,不可不察也。
 
故兵有走者、有馳者、有陷者、有崩者、有亂者、有北者。凡此六者
,非天之災,將之過也。夫勢均,以一擊十,曰走。卒強吏弱,曰馳
。吏強卒弱,曰陷。大吏怒而不服,遇敵懟而自戰,將不知其能,曰
崩。將弱不嚴,教道不明,吏卒無常,陳兵縱橫,曰亂。將不能料敵
,以少合眾,以弱擊強,兵無選鋒,曰北。凡此六者,敗之道也,將
之至任,不可不察也。
 
夫地形者,兵之助也。料敵制勝,計險厄遠近,上將之道也。知此而
用戰者必勝﹔不知此而用戰者必敗。
 
故戰道必勝,主曰無戰,必戰可也﹔戰道不勝,主曰必戰,無戰可也
。故進不求名,退不避罪,惟人是保,而利合于主,國之寶也。
 
視卒如嬰兒,故可以與之赴深谿﹔視卒如愛子,故可與之俱死。厚而
不能使,愛而不能令,亂而不能治,譬若驕子,不可用也。
 
知吾卒之可以擊,而不知敵之不可擊,勝之半也﹔知敵之可擊,而不
知吾卒之不可以擊,勝之半也﹔知敵之可擊,知吾卒之可以擊,而不
知地形之不可以戰,勝之半也。故知兵者,動而不迷,舉而不窮。故
曰:知己知彼,勝乃不殆﹔知天知地,勝乃可全。
 



 
 
 
 
11《孫子兵法》九地篇第十一               九地篇
 
 
孫子曰:用兵之法,有散地,有輕地,有爭地,有交地,有衢地,有
重地,有圮地,有圍地,有死地。諸侯自戰其地,為散地。入人之地
不深者,為輕地。我得則利,彼得亦利者,為爭地。我可以往,彼可
以來者,為交地。諸侯之地三屬,先至而得天下眾者,為衢地。入人
之地深,背城邑多者,為重地。山林、險阻、沮澤,凡難行之道者,
為圮地。所從由入者隘,所從歸者迂,彼寡可以擊我之眾者,為圍地
。疾戰則存,不疾戰則亡者,為死地。是故散地則無戰,輕地則無止
,爭地則無攻,衢地則合交,重地則掠,圮地則行,圍地則謀,死地
則戰。
 
所謂古之善用兵者,能使敵人前後不相及,眾寡不相恃,貴賤不相救
,上下不相收,卒離而不集,兵合而不齊。合于利而動,不合于利而
止。敢問:敵眾整而將來,待之若何?曰:先奪其所愛,則聽
矣。
 
兵之情主速,乘人之不及,由不虞之道,攻其所不戒也。
 
凡為客之道:深入則專,主人不克。掠于饒野,三軍足食。謹養而勿
勞,并氣積力,運并計謀,為不可測。投之無所往,死且不北。死焉
不得,士人盡力。兵士甚陷則不懼,無所往則固,深入則拘,不得已
則鬥。是故其兵不修而戒,不求而得,不約而親,不令而信。禁祥去
疑,至死無所之。吾士無餘財,非惡貨也﹔無餘命,非惡壽也。令發
之日,士卒坐者涕沾襟,偃臥者淚交頤。投之無所往者,諸、劌之勇
也。
 
故善用兵者,譬如率然。率然者,常山之蛇也。擊其首則尾至,擊其
尾則首至,擊其中則首尾俱至。敢問:兵可使如率然乎?曰:
可。夫吳人與越人相惡也,當其同舟而濟,遇風,其相救也,如左
右手。是故方馬埋輪,未足恃也。齊勇如一,政之道也,剛柔皆得,
地之理也。故善用兵者,攜手若使一人,不得已也。
 
將軍之事:靜以幽,正以治。能愚士卒之耳目,使之無知。易其事,
革其謀,使人無識。易其居,迂其途,使人不得慮。帥與之期,如登
高而去其梯。帥與之深入諸侯之地,而發其機,焚舟破釜,若驅群羊
。驅而往,驅而來,莫知所之。聚三軍之眾,投之于險,此謂將軍之
事也。九地之變,屈伸之力,人情之理,不可不察也。
 
凡為客之道:深則專,淺則散。去國越境而師者,絕地也﹔四達者,
衢地也﹔入深者,重地也﹔入淺者,輕地也﹔背固前隘者,圍地也﹔
無所往者,死地也。
 
是故散地,吾將一其志﹔輕地,吾將使之屬﹔爭地,吾將趨其後﹔交
地,吾將謹其守﹔衢地,吾將固其結﹔重地,吾將繼其食﹔圮地,吾
將進其途﹔圍地,吾將塞其闕﹔死地,吾將示之以不活。
 
故兵之情:圍則御,不得已則鬥,過則從。
 
是故不知諸侯之謀者,不能預交。不知山林、險阻、沮澤之形者,不
能行軍。不用鄉導,不能得地利。四五者,不知一,非霸、王之兵也
。夫霸、王之兵,伐大國,則其眾不得聚﹔威加于敵,則其交不得合
。是故不爭天下之交,不養天下之權,信己之私,威加于敵,則其城
可拔,其國可隳。施無法之賞,懸無政之令,犯三軍之眾,若使一人
。犯之以事,勿告以言。犯之以利,勿告以害。
 
投之亡地然後存,陷之死地然後生。夫眾陷于害,然後能為勝敗。
 
故為兵之事,在于佯順敵之意,并敵一向,千里殺將,是謂巧能成事
者也。
 
是故政舉之日,夷關折符,無通其使﹔勵于廊廟之上,以誅其事。敵
人開闔,必亟入之,先其所愛,微與之期。踐墨隨敵,以決戰事。是
故始如處女,敵人開戶,後如脫兔,敵不及拒。
 



 
 
 
 
12《孫子兵法》火攻篇第十二               火攻篇
 
 
孫子曰:凡火攻有五:一曰火人,二曰火積,三曰火輜,四曰火庫,
五曰火隊。行火必有因,煙火必素具。發火有時,起火有日。時者,
天之燥也。日者,月在萁、壁、翼、軫也。凡此四宿者,風起之日也
 
凡火攻,必因五火之變而應之。火發于內,則早應之于外。火發而其
兵靜者,待而勿攻。極其火力,可從而從之,不可從而止。火可發于
外,無待于內,以時發之。火發上風,無攻下風。晝風久,夜風止。
凡軍必知有五火之變,以數守之。
 
故以火佐攻者明,以水佐攻者強。水可以絕,不可以奪。
 
夫戰勝攻取,而不修其功者凶,命曰費留。故曰:明主慮之,良
將修之。非利不動,非得不用,非危不戰。主不可以怒而興師,將不
可以慍而致戰。合于利而動,不合于利而止。怒可以復喜,慍可以復
悅,亡國不可以復存,死者不可以復生。故明君慎之,良將警之。此
安國全軍之道也。
 



13《孫子兵法》用間篇第十三               用間篇
 
 孫子曰:凡興師十萬,出征千里,百姓之費,公家之奉,日費千金。
內外騷動,怠于道路,不得操事者,七十萬家。相守數年,以爭一日
之勝,而愛爵祿百金,不知敵之情者,不仁之至也。非人之將也,非
主之佐也,非勝之主也。故明君賢將,所以動而勝人,成功出于眾者
,先知也。先知者,不可取于鬼神,不可象于事,不可驗于度。必取
于人,知敵之情者也。
 
故用間有五:有因間,有內間,有反間,有死間,有生間。五間俱起
,莫知其道,是謂神紀,人君之寶也。因間者,因其鄉人而用之。內
間者,因其官人而用之。反間者,因其敵間而用之。死間者,為誑事
于外,令吾聞知之,而傳于敵間也。生間者,反報也。
 
故三軍之事,莫親于間,賞莫厚于間,事莫密于間。非聖智不能用間
,非仁義不能使間,非微妙不能得間之實。微哉!微哉!無所不用間
也。間事未發,而先聞者,間與所告者兼死。
 
凡軍之所欲擊,城之所欲攻,人之所欲殺,必先知其守將、左右、謁
者、門者、舍人之姓名,令吾間必索知之。
 
必索敵人之間來間我者,因而利之,導而舍之,故反間可得而用也。
因是而知之,故鄉間、內間可得而使也﹔因是而知之,故死間為誑事
可使告敵﹔因是而知之,故生間可使如期。五間之事,君必知之,知
之必在于反間,故反間不可不厚也。
 
昔殷之興也,伊摯在夏﹔周之興也,呂牙在殷。故惟明君賢將能以上
智為間者,必成大功。此兵之要,三軍之所恃而動也。


XIII. THE USE OF SPIES
1. Sun Tzu said:  Raising a host of a hundred thousand
    men and marching them great distances entails heavy loss
    on the people and a drain on the resources of the State. 
    The daily expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces
    of silver.  There will be commotion at home and abroad,
    and men will drop down exhausted on the highways. 
    As many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded
    in their labor.
 
 2. Hostile armies may face each other for years,
    striving for the victory which is decided in a single day. 
    This being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's
    condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred
    ounces of silver in honors and emoluments, is the height
    of inhumanity.
 
 3. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present
    help to his sovereign, no master of victory.
 
 4. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good
    general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond
    the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge.
 
 5. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits;
    it cannot be obtained inductively from experience,
    nor by any deductive calculation.
 
 6. Knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only
    be obtained from other men.
 
 7. Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: 
    (1) Local spies; (2) inward spies; (3) converted spies;
    (4) doomed spies; (5) surviving spies.
 
 8. When these five kinds of spy are all at work,
    none can discover the secret system.  This is called "divine
    manipulation of the threads."  It is the sovereign's
    most precious faculty.
 
 9. Having local spies means employing the services
    of the inhabitants of a district.
 
10. Having inward spies, making use of officials
    of the enemy.
 
11. Having converted spies, getting hold of the enemy's
    spies and using them for our own purposes.
 
12. Having doomed spies, doing certain things openly
    for purposes of deception, and allowing our spies to know
    of them and report them to the enemy.
 
13. Surviving spies, finally, are those who bring
    back news from the enemy's camp.
 
14. Hence it is that which none in the whole army are
    more intimate relations to be maintained than with spies. 
    None should be more liberally rewarded.  In no other
    business should greater secrecy be preserved.
 
15. Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain
    intuitive sagacity.
 
16. They cannot be properly managed without benevolence
    and straightforwardness.
 
17. Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make
    certain of the truth of their reports.
 
18. Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every
    kind of business.
 
19. If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy
    before the time is ripe, he must be put to death together
    with the man to whom the secret was told.
 
20. Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm
    a city, or to assassinate an individual, it is always
    necessary to begin by finding out the names of the attendants,
    the aides-de-camp, and door-keepers and sentries of the general
    in command.  Our spies must be commissioned to ascertain these.
 
21. The enemy's spies who have come to spy on us
    must be sought out, tempted with bribes, led away and
    comfortably housed.  Thus they will become converted
    spies and available for our service.
 
22. It is through the information brought by the
    converted spy that we are able to acquire and employ
    local and inward spies.
 
23. It is owing to his information, again, that we can
    cause the doomed spy to carry false tidings to the enemy.
 
24. Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving
    spy can be used on appointed occasions.
 
25. The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties
    is knowledge of the enemy; and this knowledge can only
    be derived, in the first instance, from the converted spy. 
    Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated
    with the utmost liberality.
 
26. Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty was due to I
    Chih who had served under the Hsia.  Likewise, the rise
    of the Chou dynasty was due to Lu Ya who had served
    under the Yin.
 
27. Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the
    wise general who will use the highest intelligence of
    the army for purposes of spying and thereby they achieve
    great results.  Spies are a most important element in water,
    because on them depends an army's ability to move.
[To Chinese text|To Top]
 
 
[END - Sun Tzu on the Art of War, text-only]
 

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